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Abstract: Models to the issue of altruism which rely on externalities of well-being are rarely 
used explicitly. In this paper we compare such utility-based approaches with the standard 
approach on altruism which is based on externalities of income. Testable differences of both 
types of models are derived in the case of incomplete information. More specifically, applied 
to the Dictator Game and the Impunity Game both played under incomplete information, the 
utility-based based approach predicts dictators to change their behavior in comparison to 
Dictator Games under complete information. Under the income-based approach, behavior 
should not differ in the three versions of the Dictator Game. 
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I. Introduction  
The fact that people are willing to help other people in real-life circumstances (e.g. by 
anonymously contributing to charities after situations of distress) is seen as classical example   3
for the existence of altruism among human beings. Since the laboratory experiments on the 
Dictator game, where about 2/3 of the subjects give away - under complete anonymity - 20% 
to 50% of their endowment,
1 altruistic motives gained further prominence as an explanation 
for these observations.
2 However, doubts were also raised against the interpretation that 
participants were making transfers to anonymous others for altruistic reasons. In particular 
Bolton and Zwick (1995) and later on Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels 
(2000) attributed other fairness related motives to these choices.
3 
In this paper we aim to offer a different perspective. Instead of searching for further motives 
beyond the egoistic “homo oeconomicus” model of man, we aim to analyze more deeply the 
existing models on altruistic behavior. Most approaches modelling altruistic choices have 
focused on material outcomes for donators and recipients. According to these models (which 
we will call models of income-based altruism) the donator aims at increasing the income of 
the recipient (see for instance Collard (1978) or Andreoni and Miller (2002)). In contrast to 
this, in Becker’s model (1974) and also in Barro (1974) it is assumed that altruistic moves aim 
at increasing the utility of the recipient (which we will call the utility-based model). 
In order to clarify the differences between the two approaches this paper, we analyse their 
implications under incomplete information. In a second step we will derive new hypotheses 
for behavior in laboratory experiments. These may allow to answer the crucial question 
whether it is indeed altruism which guides behavior in certain experiments. According to the 
present analysis, it will turn out that in Dictator Games the information status of the 
participants is of importance. We will show in the rest of the paper that depending on whether 
objective “facts” (income) or “happiness” (utility) of others determine behavior, the 
information status will have an impact on the choices of altruistically motivated persons. 
In Section II, the two approaches are compared on the basis of simple scenarios. In Section 
III, we will discuss the formation of consistent expectations of the others’ utilities. Section IV 
provides examples of this formation and show how the approaches can be experimentally 
tested. Section V discusses the question of “amplifying” is “dampening” altruism. Section VI 
concludes. 
II. Income- and Utility-based altruism 
In terms of utility theory, altruistic behavior is caused by external effects. There are, as 
mentioned in section I, two main approaches which differ in the origin of the externalities. In 
                                            
1 See e.g. Forsythe et al (1994) whose experiment has become a benchmark in the meantime. 
2 Besides Forsythe et al. (1994) it was Eckel and Grossman (1996), Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) and 
Andreoni and Miller (2002) who favored this interpretation of the experiments. 
3 Further, Hoffman et al. (1994), Güth and Huck (1997) and Bolton et al. (1998) suggested different kind of 
interpretations for this behavior in the Dictator game.   4
most approaches it is assumed that a person's utility is influenced either by other persons' 
consumption of goods or by other persons' income. 
(1)  () , ,..., ,..., 1 n i i i x x x V U =  i = 1,...,n, with xj = income (or consumption) of person j. 
where xi represents i’s consumption, and x1,..., xn represent the consumption of individuals j 
with whom person i interacts. Given (1) and  0 / > ∂ ∂ j i x U , i ’s utility is increased if j enjoys a 
higher income. If the cost/benefit relation  x xi ∆ ∆ /  is small enough, i will carry out a “helping 
act”  ( ) j i x x ∆ ∆ , , which results in incomes  i i x x ∆ −  and  j j x x ∆ + . If  0 / < ∂ ∂ j i x U  i is ready 
to incur cost to decrease  j x . Examples of the income based approach are the fairness theories 
of Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) and Fehr and Schmidt (1999). 
Instead of this, Gary Becker (1974) has proposed a utility-based setting: 
(2)  () n i i i i i U U U U x U U ,... , ,... , 1 1 1 + − = , i = 1,...,n, 
where  U1,.. U i-1, Ui+1,...,Un represent the utilities of individuals j with whom altruist i 
interacts. If  0 / > ∂ ∂ j i U U   i ’s utility is increased if j ’s utility (j≠ i) is increased or i is 
’happy’ if j is ’happy’. The contrary applies if  0 / < ∂ ∂ j i u U . 
The central question in approach (2) is now how i receives information about the utilities Uj, j 
≠ i. In Scenarios 1 and 2, we will start with extreme assumptions with respect to this question. 
Scenario 1 (complete information): All individuals know all xi and all functions (2). They 
determine (compute) equilibrium values of Uj from the system of equations (2). 
Scenario 1 is the most simple case and serves to discuss the nature of utilities in the approach 
(2). On the one hand, under the utility-based approach seemingly unrelated utility functions 
may turn out to be equivalent from the viewpoint of decision making. Examples are, in the 
two person case, Ui = aixi + bi Uj and  i b
j
i x i a
i U e U ) (
' ' = . 
On the other hand, utilities in (2) have to be nearly absolute measures of well-being. While in 
(1), every utility function can be separately transformed by an arbitrary increasing 
transformation (under certainty) or at least by an arbitrary increasing linear transformation 
(under uncertainly), a transformation like this is not possible in (2).  j i i i i U b x a U + = , i ≠ j, i,   5








x U + =  which becomes apparent when the equations are 
solved to get to (1). 
Scenario 2 (no information, truthful signalling): Every individual i knows xi, i does neither 
know xj , j ≠ i, nor the function (2) by which the utilities of others are determined. Instead, i 
receives signals about Uj, j ≠ i. If signals are truthful, an adaptation process may result in the 
equilibria of Scenario 1. 
Bolle (1991) discusses necessary and sufficient conditions for the convergence of this 
adaptation process. However, the existence of a world with truthful signals is unrealistic.
4 
More importantly, the two extreme Scenarios 1 or 2 mostly lead to a unique vector of utilities, 
i.e. (x1, ..., xn) determines (U1, ..., Un) or equation (2) determines equation (1), making it 
seemingly unnecessary to use the less tractable utility-based approach.
5 
In a dynamic world under incomplete information, the utility-based approach has completely 
different implications than the income-based approach. (1) depends on “objective” income 
only, not on “subjective” utility (well-being) of others. Thus, the utility of i does not change 
under (1) if the income vector is preserved while the utility function of others is altered. 
Under (2), the utility of i as well as the derived system of (1) are subject to changes. Thus, 
under incomplete information about the other’s utility function, we have a variability which 
evokes the true differences between the approaches. 
To explain it more formally: Assume that the utility functions in (2) stem from a certain 
family of functions which is indicated by the dependence of Ui not only on xi and Uj, j ≠ i, but 
also on a parameter ai. If we now compute Vi of (1) from the system (2), we will find that Vi 
depends also on aj, j ≠ i, i.e. on the parameters of others.
6 
Firstly, however, we have to have a closer look on the formation of expectations under the 
utility-based approach. 
                                            
4 While Collard’s (1978) interpretation is that people wear utility meters in their face, Bergstrom (1989) mocks 
about such an assumption by painting Romeo and Juliet as having gauges with pointers directly above their 
navels indicating their status of happiness. 
5 Nevertheless, under complete information and in a static world, Becker’s approach (1974) provides us with 
some plausible restrictions on the system (1). Firstly, the friend of my friend as well as the enemy of my enemy 
are my friends. Secondly, altruism within a group can be caused not only by “loving ties” within this group but 
also by loving or even by hateful ties to another group. For these and other implications of the utility-based 
approach, see Bolle (1991). 
6 Levine (1998) starts his investigation with a similar utility function. However, in contrast to us, he does not 
trace back his model to the utility-based approach.   6
III. Consistent expectations 
In Scenario 1, individuals have to “compute” the utilities from system (2), i.e. they develop 
expectations about the utilities of all j ≠ i which again determine their own utilities. Let  j iU E  
denote the expectations of i about the utility of j. If we now also focus on a third individual k, 
then k has not only to develop expectations  i kU E  but also  j i k U E E , i.e. expectations about 
the expectations of i, etc. In our “computation” we have implicitly assumed that 
j j i k n j i k j i EU U E E E U E E U E = = = = ... . If this is true, we will call these values “consistent 
expectations”. In particular it is required that j anticipates i's expectation formation  j EU . If 
all have complete information, individuals will have utilities  j j EU U =  assuming that there is 
only one “solution” of system (2). 
Under incomplete information, matters are more complicated. 
Scenario 3 (private information about independently varying income): The functional 
forms (2) are common knowledge, income xi is private knowledge of i. In particular, the 
functional forms are  
(3)   ()( ) ∑ − =
k
i ik i ik i u P x y U ,  ( ) n i i i U U U U U ,... , ,..., 1 1 1 + − − = . 
() n x x x ,..., 1 =  is a random variable with the distribution function  ( )( ) n n x F x F ⋅ ⋅... 1 1 , i knows 
i x , but not  () n i i i x x x x x ,... , ,..., 1 1 1 + − − = . 
Assume that i forms consistent expectations  ik EP  and that all players draw the same 
conclusion about i’s expectation  ik EP . Then, it is possible to compute the  ik EP  values. In all 
equations (3)  () i ik U P −  are substituted by  ik EP . This leads to 
(4)  () ( ) () ( ) ( ) n i i i ik ik x dF x dF x dF x dF U P EP ... ... 1 1 1 + − − ∫ =  for all i,k.  
The functions of  () i ik U P − are independent of xi. Thus, (4) is a system of equations for constant 
values  ik EP . 
It should be added that, if we vary Scenario 3, i.e. if we assume that the parameters of the 
functions (2) are private knowledge, the outcome is the same. 
Remarks: 1) After a deviation from complete information, Ui is usually different from  i EU , 
the utility which all others expect i to have. 2.) The approach in this section allows for a 
certain amount of asymmetric information.  ( ) i i x F  may be different from ( ) j j x F , i j ≠ . It   7
cannot express, however, that j is better informed about xi than k. 3) The assumption that 
parameters of the functions (2) are private knowledge is no principle difference to Scenario 3. 
Scenario 4 (Signalling): If actions of an individual i can be observed by all other individuals, 
then these individuals are able to derive conclusions about the income xi or about the 
parameters of Ui. After an action of i, xi may be common knowledge, or the action may serve 
to “update” the distribution Fi(xi), or the distribution of other parameters. 
In Scenarios 3 and 4 we assumed independent private income and/or parameter values 
(comparable to independent private values in auctions). Giving up this assumption has the 
consequence that consistency as defined in this section does not exist any longer. In the 
Appendix, we will outline how cases of dependent values should be handled by the 
introduction of “second order” consistency. 
Scenario 5 (A special case of asymmetric information): Assume that xi, i=1,…,m are 
common knowledge while xi, i=m+1,…n are private information. 
Under these circumstances, let us further assume that  i i EU U =  for i=1,…,m, i.e. the other 
individuals have correct expectations about the utility of i. For the other Ui we form consistent 
expectations as demonstrated above. EPik, i=m+1,…,n are now functions of x1,…,x
m. 
For all other cases than those described, it seems to be necessary to derive higher order 
consistent expectations. An example is given in the Appendix. 
IV. Applications of the utility-based Approach 
IV. 1: The dictator game with asymmetric information about the pie size 
In the usual Dictator Game under complete information, one person (the dictator D) is 
endowed with a known amount of money (a pie of size P) which he can divide arbitrarily 
between himself by keeping x D and Person 2 (the recipient R) by transferring xR. In the 
variation, we will analyze here, the Dictator Game is changed insofar as the dictator is 
endowed again with an amount P where the pie size is known to the Dictator. The recipient is 
not informed about the size. She only knows the distribution of possible pie sizes. 
According to the income-based approach, the dictator has no reason to condition his behavior 
on the information status of the recipient. He will transfer always the same amount xR. 
According to the utility-based approach (2) the dictator may have reason to condition his 
decision on the information status of the recipient. However, to be able to show this, it is 
necessary to further specify the utility functions described in (2), since these are too general to 
be useful for the Dictator Game (and later in this paper for the Impunity Game). Therefore,   8
we will introduce a specification of this approach, which is based on earlier research on equity 
theory and which fits into this class of games. Consider the following utility functions 
(9)  UD = xD + aD (xD – sD) UR,   aD, sD > 0 
(10)  UR = xR + aR (xR – sR) UD,   aR, sR > 0 
which consist of an egoistic and an altruistic term.
7 According to earlier psychological 
research on equity theory (e.g. Walster et al. (1978)) and on the theory of justice (e.g. Mikula 
(1983) and Reis (1983)) we further suppose that individuals have altruistic motives as long as 
their actual income is higher than a certain minimum income of si.
8 
The recipient’s income xR stems from the dictator transfer: 
(11)  xD = P - xR, 
Let us proceed with the analysis of a simplified Dictator Game under incomplete information. 
Suppose that there are only two sizes; the dictator is endowed either with PL with Prob = α or 
with PS < PL with Prob = 1 - α. The Dictator knows his actual pie size while the recipient is 
informed only about the probability distribution. In addition, assume that the dictator has only 
one choice in the case of a small pie, namely the equal split (xR = PS/2). In the case of the 
large pie, he has only two choices, xR = PS/2 or xR = PL/2. To further simplify the problem, we 
suppose all parameters of the utility functions to be common knowledge. The dictator is 
assumed to make his decision when he knows the pie size.
9 The only decision the dictator has 
to make in case of the large pie (P=PL) is whether to give PL/2 or PS/2. Thus, the dictator has 
two strategies. Strategy I: always xR = Ps/2. Strategy II: always equal division xR = P/2. 
With respect to the recipient, we suppose that she anticipates the dictator’s strategy. Further 
assuming that the Dictator uses a pure strategy, the recipient will do the following 
conjectures: If she receives PL/2 she knows that P = PL. If she gains PS/2 and if the dictator 
chooses xR = P/2 then she knows that P = PS. If she gets PS/2 and if the dictator’s strategy is 
always xR = PS/2 then she assumes P = PL with Prob = α. In the latter case, she estimates 
(12)  EXD  = α (PL – Ps/2) +  (1 - α) PS/2 
        = α PL + (1 - 2α) PS/2. 
                                            
7 These utility functions are very simple. They will serve only for numerical examples. It is obviously possible to 
switch from absolute to relative or, more generally, “normalised“ income where the normalisation procedure has 
to be discussed explicitly. 
8 Similar assumptions are the basis of the fairness theories of Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) and Fehr and Schmidt 
(1999). 
9 The problem changes if the dictator is able to commit in advance to a strategy.   9
We may compute the alternative utilities (if P = PL) under the pure Strategy I (xR = PS/2) and 
the pure Strategy II (xR = P/2). In both cases we assume that all parameters of (9) and (10) are 
common knowledge. Using (3) and (4), we are able to calculate the utility UR = UR(xR) which 
is common knowledge and UD = UD(xD) which is private knowledge (R only knows EUD). 
We obtain
10 
(13)  UR = EUR = 
) (x   ) ( a   1
) (
R R R D D D
D R R R R
s s Ex a




(14)  UD = xD + aD (xD – sD) EUR. 
We have to insert ExD = xD = xR = PL/2 under Strategy II and P = PL, xD = PL – PS/2, xR = 
PS/2 and ExD from (12) under Strategy I. 
It is possible to show that there are cases where Strategy I is chosen and cases where Strategy 
II is optimal for the dictator.
11 The crucial point is that, only under the utility-based approach, 
Strategy II might be optimal when the recipient has complete information and Strategy I when 
she has incomplete information. We prove this proposition by a numerical example. 
If PL = 6, PS = 2 and α = 0.25 then ExD = 2 if the dictator transfers xR = PS/2 = 1. Assume in 
addition, aD = aR = 0.4 and sD = sR = 2 then (13) and (14) imply 
(15) 
) 2 1 )( 2 2 ( 16 . 0 1
2 ) 2 1 ( 4 . 0 1





D U   = 5.24. 
(15) shows the utility the dictator enjoys when he is endowed with the large pie and uses 
Strategy I. Using Strategy II, he gets xD = ExD = 3, which results in the utility 
(16) 
) 2 3 )( 2 3 ( 16 . 0 1
3 ) 2 3 ( 4 . 0 3





D U   = 5. 
Under complete information, the value of Strategy II remains the same. The value of Strategy 
I changes because of ExD = xD = 5. This leads to 
(17) 
I
D U  (complete information) = 5 + 0.4(5-2) 
) 2 1 ( ) 2 5 ( 16 . 0 1
5 ) 2 1 ( 4 . 0 1
− ⋅ − ⋅ −
⋅ − +
  =4.19. 
                                            
10 This shows, once more, the pivot of coping with incomplete information in this model. R does not know UD, 
she has to form a (consistent) expectation EUD. This firm value enters R’s utility function and EUR is computed 
under the condition of a firm value EUD. 
11 In order to show that a pure Strategy II is optimal it is not sufficient to show that UD is higher under Strategy II 
than under Strategy I. If the recipient expects the dictator to play the pure Strategy II then the dictator may be 
tempted to offer PS/2 if he is endowed with P = PL, trying to exploit the recipient’s (erroneous) expectation xD = 
PS/2. Only if this offer is also inferior to playing Strategy II, strategy II is really played. Otherwise a mixed 
strategy will emerge where the choices of xR = PS/2 as well as of xR = PL/2 have the same value UD.   10
Conclusion 1: The utility-based approach expects some Dictators to choose Strategy I when 
there is asymmetric information about the pie size, and to prefer Strategy II under complete 
information. This result provides us with a simple possibility to test the two approaches to 
altruism by comparing behavior in Dictator Games with and without complete information. 
IV. 2: The Impunity Game 
In this section, we further compare the two approaches by focusing on another variation of the 
Dictator Game, the Impunity Game (of Bolton and Zwick (1995)). In the Impunity Game the 
dictator is endowed with a known amount of money which he may again divide between the 
recipient and himself. The recipient is given the choice to either accept or decline the 
dictator’s offer. In the latter case xR is lost and not given back to the dictator. The dictator, 
however, can keep his own share xD irrespective of the choice of the recipient. The crucial 
question is now whether any of the altruistic approaches will predict that a recipient might be 
willing to “throw away” any positive amount transferred to him and how a Dictator might 
react according to these models if he anticipates such a behavior. 
Using again the utility functions of (9) and (10), in this case xD and xR are common 
knowledge. In the Impunity Game it is now the Dictator who has to make a decision under 
incomplete information. Therefore, assume that sR is private knowledge of R. For the sake of 
simplicity, assume all other parameters to be common knowledge. Following the procedure of 
section III, we get 
(18)  ()
() ( ) R R D D R D
R D D D D
D D Es x s x a a








(19)  () D R R R R R EU s x a x U − + = ' '  
with  R R x x = ' if the recipient accepts the transfer and  0 ' = R x  if the recipient rejects her share 
of the pie. EsR is the conditional expectation resulting from the decision of the recipient. 
When the dictator has to decide, he has to take into account both possibilities of the recipient, 
acceptance and rejection. 
If  R R s x < '  then (19) implies that the recipient aims to decrease the utility of the dictator 
(EUD) which is why she will decide to reject the transfer ( 0 ' = R x ). If 
(20)   () () ( ) 0 ' / 1
0 '
= − +
∆ − = =
R R D D R D
D
R R R R x s E s x a a
x
a x U  
() ( )
()( ) () R R R R D D R D
R D D D D
R R R R x x s E x s x a a
x s x a x
s x a x




  () R R R x x U = = '    11
Assume that the minimum income requirement of the dictator is sD=P/2 and of the recipient is 
sR=0 with Prob α =  and sR=P/2 with Prob α − =1 . (P is again the size of the pie). The 
dictator will always give less then half the pie. If sR=0, the recipient will never reject a 
positive xR, thus 
(21)  () 2 / 0 ' / P x s E R R = = . 
If xR is so small that it would only be accepted by recipients with sR=0 then 
(22)   () 0 ' / = = R R R x x s E . 
If xR is large enough to be accepted even by recipients with  2 / P sR =  then 
(23)   () ( ) 2 / 1 ' / P x x s E R R R α − = = . 
There exist two possible types of equilibria with pure strategies  R x' . A separating equilibrium 
with  0 ' = R x  if  2 / P sR =  and  R R x x = '  if  0 = R s , and a pooling equilibrium  R R x x = ' . A 
special case of the pooling equilibrium is xR = 0. 




R x x < where (20) becomes an equality given (22) 
and (23). In this case 
separating
R R x x ≤ < 0  induces the separating equilibrium and 
pooling
R R x x ≥  





R x x x < <  there are mixed strategy equilibria. 
By backward induction, we are able to determine the optimal choice xR. If α  - the probability 
of being matched with a recipient with a low s - is small enough then the risk of being 
involved in a separating equilibrium may be too high for the dictator. In this case he will 
decide for  0 = R x . 
Conclusion 2: The utility-based approach as specified in equations (9) and (10) predicts that 
recipients may “burn” transfers when these are smaller than their minimum requirement sR. 
Since a rejection would decrease the utility of dictators, this approach also predicts that 
dictators will decide differently if they anticipate such behavior. In comparison to the standard 
Dictator Game where many dictators transfer small amounts to their recipients, in the 
Impunity Game they will tend to transfer either nothing or more than in the Dictator Game. 
The income-based approach does not predict any difference to the standard Dictator Game. 
V. Amplifying and dampening altruism 
So far our approach was focused on rather static games (the Dictator Game and its variations) 
where the dictator is influenced by the recipient’s decision only indirectly. These games are, 
therefore, the purest test for altruistic motives, since a person is able to express his willingness 
to reduce his own level consumption in order to change the utility of a fellow person.   12
In earlier research it was also suggested that altruistic behavior could be a principle motive in 
dynamic games, as well. The observations in the Centipede Game (see McKelvey and Palfrey 
(1992)) or other laboratory experiments involving mutual exchange processes (see Fehr and 
Fischbacher (2003) underlined that altruism could be the baseline for co-operative behavior in 
later stages of these games with more than one stage.
12 The suggestion was rejected by many 
experiments involving the sequential Prisoners’ Dilemma (cf. e.g. Bolle and Ockenfels 
(1990), Clark and Sefton (2001)) where second movers do not co-operate when first movers 
defected, and the Ultimatum Game (cf. e.g. Güth et al. (1996)) where respondents reject 
unfair splits.
13 These observations indicated that in some dynamic games where decisions are 
embedded in a strategic setting, different motives (such as positive or negative reciprocity, 
induced envy or inequity aversion) prevail. 
Therefore, it might be worth to further analyse linkages between altruism and reciprocity 
within the present framework. In the utility-based approach, the propensity of a Person 1 to 
help a Person 2 depends on the expectations of Person 1 about the intention of Person 2 to 
help Person 1. This is a form of implicit reciprocity which does not depend on real but on 
expected actions. We will further call this amplifying altruism. 
In the following, we will discuss to what extent amplifying altruism may exist in static 
settings when two persons are involved. If the altruism function (2) is concerned with xi = 
total income of i instead of xi = income change (income distributed in an experiment or 
income from a certain business transaction) then, in most cases, it is appropriate to linearize 
(2) under the assumption of small possible income changes  i x ∆ . 
(24)  2 1 1 1 1 U b x a U ∆ + ∆ = ∆ . 
(25)  1 2 2 2 2 U b x a U ∆ + ∆ = ∆ . 
Assume for both individuals a one-parametric family of (linearised) utility functions a i = 
ai(bi) and b1b2 < 1 in order to prevent “excessive altruism”.




2 2 1 1 1
1 1 b b




= ∆ , 
                                            
12 Cf. Levine (1998) who based his approach on these experimental results. 
13 Interestingly, when dictators had to make the same decisions in binary choice dictator games as the 
respondents in the Ultimatum Game, (e.g. the choice between an unequal splits in favor of the other player or a 
zero payoff for both players), many distributions where accepted in the Dictator Game which were rejected in 
the strategic setting of the Ultimatum Game (see Kritikos and Bolle (2001)). 
14 See Collard (1978) for the „after you“ problem and Bolle (1991) for a generalisation of this condition in the n 
person case.   13
(27) 
2 1
1 1 2 2 1
2 1 b b




= ∆ . 
Person 1 prefers an action connected with  ) x     , ( 2 1 ∆ ∆x  to the decision of ‘no action’ 




1 = ∆ ∆x  if  0 2 2 1 1 1 > ∆ + ∆ x a b x a , or if the price  2 1/ x x ∆ ∆ −  is 





. A “helping act” is one with  0 1 < ∆x , 
0 2 > ∆x ; a punishing act results in  0 1 < ∆x  and  0 2 < ∆x . 
If we further assume ai > 0
15, the assumption of Person 1 being altruistic then leads to b1 > 0. 




1 2 > ∂ ∂ b
b a
a b
 then, with increasing b2 Person 2’s altruism extends. If such a 
parametrization exists for Person 2, altruism in Person 1 is amplified, if  0 / 2 2 > ∂ ∂ b a . The 





 increases, i.e. 1’s altruism increases 
when 2’s altruism increases. If  0 / 2 2 < ∂ ∂ b a  then 2’s altruism causes a dampening effect. 
Examples:   ai = 1 + bi, i = 1, 2, is an example of amplifying altruism. 
ai = 1 - bi is an example of dampening altruism. 
                     ai = 1 implies “neutral” altruism not being affected by the other’s altruism. 
When analysing the same approach under incomplete information, we will see that there is an 
additional effect. Assume  i x ∆  to be private knowledge while ai and bi are be common 
knowledge. We have, first of all, again to determine consistently expected utilities, which are 
(28) 
2 1
2 2 1 1 1
1 1 b b




= ∆ .  
The utility change which Person 1 enjoys is 
(29)  2 1 1 1 1 U E b x a U ∆ + ∆ = ∆ . 
Disregarding in a first step the signalling properties of an act, if  0 1 > ∆U , Person 1 carries out 
an act connected with costs  1 x ∆  (which he knows) and benefits  2 x ∆  (of which Person 1 only 
knows the distribution). This leads to 
(30)  0 ) ( 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 > ∆ − ∆ + ∆ + ∆ x x E a b b x E a b x a . 
For b2 = 0, Person 1 will help Person 2 if the expected utility increase outweighs the cost of 
Person 1. For b2 > 0, also the difference of Person 2’s expectation in comparison with the real 
cost of Person 1 matters. If Person 2 underestimates the cost of Person 1, Person 1 is ready to 
                                            
15 ai < 0 would imply that the respective person has ‘masochistic’ preferences.   14
carry out acts he would not have carried out under complete information, and vice versa. 
Thus, there is an incentive not to “disappoint” the other’s expectations.
16 17 
If we take now into account that Person 1 helping Person 2 is a signal for Person 2 that (24) 
should apply and vice versa, then the expectation value of  1 x E∆  has to be revised. When (30) 
applies (under this expectation value), the act is carried out and consistent (conditional) 
expectations  1 x E∆  have been determined. Vice versa, when (30) does not apply with revised 
expectations, the act is not carried out. This leads to a restriction of the above result: The 
signalling property of an action weakens the incentive to carry out the action. Instead of 
getting a unique result, when taking the signal of the action into account, no action might be 
supported by (30). In this case Person 1 will choose a mixed strategy. If this happens for 
certain xi-values, the mixed strategy has to be considered in all updating processes. 
VI. Conclusion and Discussion 
Recent experimental evidence has renewed the discussion to what extent non-egoistic human 
acts could be classified as altruistic. Instead of considering the ‘pros and cons’ of using 
altruistic models as an explanation for observed behavior, the present paper deepens the 
understanding of altruistic choices by introducing incomplete information and derives new 
testable hypothesis for further experiments. 
By comparing the two existing approaches– the utility- and the income-based approach to 
altruism – under incomplete information, we show that there is no unique solution. While the 
income-based approach always expects an altruistically motivated person to behave in the 
same way as under complete information, the utility-based approach foresees that incomplete 
information may change decisions substantially. 
More specifically, we showed that, under the precondition of consistent expectations, the 
utility-based approach expects certain participants of a Dictator Game to reduce their transfers 
if recipients have incomplete instead of complete information about the pie size. The utility-
based approach also expects that in the Impunity Game (where dictators have incomplete 
information about the acceptance level of the recipients) dictators will either increase or 
decrease their transfers to zero, if they expect recipients to reject their own share of the pie. 
                                            
16 Note that the dictator behavior, discussed in IV.I, may also be explained along this line. In the Dictator Game 
with incomplete information, it is not the price of altruism which is private knowledge but the income of the 
dictator. For 1 = D, we get  P EP x Ex − = − 1 1 . If the dictator is provided with a large pie, then  0 < −P EP  
and the dictator will transfer less than under complete information. 
17 All results apply for both persons. Moreover, it is possible to generalize the 2-person bilinear model of this 
section. Introducing a third person gives rise to another form of amplifying (or dampening) altruism. If a Person 
3’s altruism towards 1 and 2 increases then the altruism between 1 and 2 will be amplified (see Bolle (1991)).   15
First experimental tests (cf. Kritikos and Bolle (2004 a,b)) indicate that the expected subgroup 
of dictators indeed reduced their transfers in the Dictator Game under incomplete information 
and increased or decreased their transfers in the Impunity Game – both games compared to 
the behavior in the Dictator game under complete information. The fact that we observed the 
predicted changes in the behavior of the participants is in support of the utility-based model. 
In the last section of the paper we further analysed the consequences of human beings putting 
themselves in the places of others. We showed that depending on the expectations of an 
altruistically motivated person about the behavior of his ‘counterparts’ the altruistic choices 
might be amplified or dampened. We also showed that the effect of amplified altruism might 
be changed when there is incomplete information about the cost of an altruistic move. 
In this context it should be pointed out that amplifying altruism is the main hypothesis of 
Levine (1998). However, in contrast to the present approach, Levine (1998) directly 
introduces amplifying altruism in his model without tracing it back to any fundamental theory 
of altruism. His model, therefore, is not capable of the changes of behavior observed in the 
modified Dictator Game and in the Impunity Game. Levine (1998) further argues that choices 
in strategic settings which have a reciprocal component (such as the Ultimatum Game) may 
also be explained by his approach of amplifying altruism.
18 
Selten and Ockenfels (1998), in their discussion of the 3-person Solidarity Game, conclude 
with a crucial question which could become the baseline for further tests. They argue that they 
are not able to distinguish whether “my expectation of the third person’s altruism guides my 
behavior toward the second person” (which would be in favor of amplifying altruism and 
which could not be explained by reciprocity) or whether “my behavior guides my 
expectations about others’ altruism” (which would allow for the existence of ‘correlated 
expectations’). Future experiments on altruism could answer this indeterminacy.  
                                            
18 Levine does not separate amplifying altruism from reciprocity. He applies his model also on the Ultimatum 
Game and on other dynamic games.  The high frequencies of spite (70%) which Levine (1998) derives in 
particular from ultimatum experiments are incompatible with the high frequencies of transferring positive 
amounts in dictator experiments (cf. Kritikos and Bolle (2001)).   16
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Appendix: Consistent expectation without independent values. 
Assume that the random variable  ( ) n x x x ,..., 1 =  is determined according to the joint 
distribution F(x) and that Ui is described by (3). Then i develops expectations  ik iP E  which 
depend on  i i x x = . j’s expectations of  ik iP E , however, is constant. We will call 
(31)  ik i j ik P E E EP =   () dF U P
x
i ik ∫ − =   
consistent expectations. Again, in the system (33) all  ( ) i ik U P −  are substituted by  ik EP : then, 
(33) provides us with a system of equation for  ik EP . 
After the determination of  ik EP  we are able to compute  
(32)  ()( ) ∫ = = − − i i i i ik ik i x x x dF U P P E ,  
and 
(33)  () ∑ =
k
ik i i ik i P E x g U . 